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How to deal with convicted terrorists and returned foreign fighters is an ongoing policy 
challenge. A key concern for governments is to reduce the future risks that such individuals 
may present, particularly when released into the community. Responses have entailed 
legislative approaches that allow for the ongoing detention of convicted terrorists beyond their 
release date, or provide opportunities to expel and deport individuals and strip them of their 
citizenship so they can no longer return to specific countries (Hardy & Williams, 2016; 
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Abstract 
Dealing with released convicted terrorists and returned foreign fighters is a major 
policy challenge. One option is to mandate their participation in intervention 
programs. This paper will review evidence relating to mandatory participation in 
interventions targeting convicted terrorists and individuals at risk of radicalisation, 
consider the benefits and drawbacks of mandating participation and explore 
relevant implementation issues relating to the adoption of mandatory programs. 
The following methodology was adopted: (1) a rapid scoping review across the 
fields of countering violent extremism, sex and violent offender rehabilitative 
programming; (2) a review of relevant policy documents and legislative sources; 
and (3) consultations with international experts. The conclusion drawn is that 
mandated participation may offer some benefits, but these need to be weighed 
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Walker & Cawley, 2021). Another option relates to ensuring that radicalised individuals are 
exposed to interventions that divert them from further engagement in violent extremist acts 
and address individual risks and needs. While the evidence-base surrounding the impact of 
interventions targeting individuals at risk of radicalisation or known terrorists is limited 
(Cherney, 2018b; Koehler, 2017), an additional question relevant to program effectiveness is 
whether participation should be mandatory to guarantee individuals are exposed to some type 
of support/diversionary scheme. While the general consensus in the literature is that 
participation in interventions to counter violent extremism (CVE) should be voluntary (see 
below) - what exactly is the evidence for and against mandatory participation and what might 
be the broader lessons for the design of interventions? The current paper aims to address these 
questions.   
We define mandatory participation as referring to the parameters of involvement and 
entry into a program and whether it is linked to legislation or some other condition (e.g., 
accessing parole) that stipulates participation and treatment as a requirement. This may 
involve, for example, a radicalised offender being mandated as part of a court order to 
participate in a support program. There are variations across jurisdictions as to the mandatory 
nature of CVE programs (ICSR, 2020; Koehler, 2017). Some involve voluntary participation, 
such as the PRISM intervention in New South Wales, Australia (see Cherney, 2018b). Other 
approaches can be more coercive and are explicitly linked to legislative conditions, such as 
participation in the UK’s Desistance and Disengagement Programme (DDP) (Elshimi, 2020). 
Hence, participation in a CVE program can potentially span across mandated/mandatory 
involvement, which means individuals have little choice but to participate and risk a sanction 
if they do not comply, to voluntary involvement where clients freely consent to participate. 
Even in contexts where program participation is voluntary, there may be implicit forms of 
coercion to be involved given the unequal relationships between offenders and official 
agencies.  
This research involved a rapid review of evaluation evidence and literature pertaining 
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convicted terrorists and individuals identified as at risk of violent extremism. To complement 
this analysis, evidence and literature on mandatory conditions relating to offenders who have 
committed physical and sexual violence was examined. This area provides potential useful 
lessons as to the viability of mandatory program participation and whether it reduces risk, 
given this has been a key area of debate relating to the efficacy of programs targeting sexual 
and violent offenders (Grossi, 2017).2 Scholars have acknowledged the usefulness of 
examining other policy fields that can provide potential lessons for responses to violent 
extremism (Decker & Pyrooz, 2015; LaFree, & Freilich, 2016). In combining different areas 
of scholarship, this paper aims to review existing evidence to identify the effectiveness of 
mandatory conditions in rehabilitation and reintegration, and consider applicable issues 
pertaining to the implementation of mandatory participation in CVE interventions. This will 
allow for consideration of the key benefits and drawbacks of such an approach.  
This research involved a rapid scoping review of the existing evaluation research in 
the areas of CVE and violent and sex offender programs. It also involved consultations with 
international experts (i.e., an informal consultative group based on the first author’s academic 
and professional contacts), which entailed requesting via email country-specific information 
relating to mandatory participation in CVE programs. This exchange did not involve any 
formal interview, but asked contacts to respond to a series of questions related to mandated 
conditions in their specific country. The project also included a review of policy documents 
and legislative sources and an examination of identified ancillary literature that considered 
issues relating to the behavioural science and effectiveness of mandatory participation in 
correctional and community-based interventions.  
The paper is organised as follows. We first provide results from our rapid evidence 
review on CVE, sex, and violent offender programs. Next we examine how various countries 
have addressed the issue of participation in CVE programs and the use of mandatory 
 
2 Given the need to set parameters to contain our review on crime related program areas, we acknowledge as 
pointed out by one of the reviewers, that forms of psychotherapy or psychiatric treatment occurs in non-
voluntary situations (mental health admissions), with professionals having to work with clients who feel 
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conditions. This is followed by consideration of the implementation issues relating to the 
adoption of mandatory participation in CVE interventions, and the various benefits and 
drawbacks of such an approach are considered. The paper ends with outlining key findings 
and considers if mandatory participation is a viable option. 
 
Rapid Evidence Review 
 
To reduce bias and guide the rapid review component of our study, we developed a search, 
screening, and coding protocol. The PRISMA procedure for conducting systematic reviews3 
informed this process, but we do not report our results here according to PRISMA. That 
would require significantly more detail and an assessment of the risk of bias and a different 
way of reporting the results. Our method was a rapid scoping review, informed by rigorous 
systematic review methods, which is potentially a limitation with our approach.  
We searched4 two databases of evaluation studies that are built using comprehensive 
searches and screening processes and have been used to conduct systematic reviews on 
criminal justice programs: the Global Policing Database (GPD) and a Corrections Database 
(CD) (see Higginson, Eggins, & Mazerolle, 2017; Sydes, Eggins & Mazerolle, 2018). These 
databases were chosen because members of the team had used them to conduct systematic 
reviews on CVE approaches (see Mazerolle et al 2020, 2021) and due to our focus on 
evaluated interventions that target convicted terrorists and at-risk individuals, and which 
typically involve correctional agencies and police as lead agencies or partners. The GPD and 
CD were also utilised because they provide comprehensive coverage of both published and 
unpublished grey and academic literature and include high-quality experimental and quasi-
experimental evaluations of interventions relating to policing and corrections.5  
 
3 See https://www.bmj.com/content/372/bmj.n71 for an outline of the PRISMA statement.  
4 For more detail on the search terms used please see Appendix A in Cherney et al (2021).  
5 For more detail on the GPD and the protocol underpinning it see Higginson et al., (2014) and 
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The full-text for each study captured by the search was assessed according to the 
following inclusion criteria: (1) a publication date between January 2001 and December 20186 
and written in English; (2) the evaluated intervention directly related to CVE, violent and/or 
sex offenders; (3) the intervention participants were offenders who may have been detained in 
prison, other custodial settings, within the community (e.g., probation or parole), or in the re-
entry phase; (4) the impact evaluation of a mandatory intervention based in a custodial or 
community setting; (5) the evaluated eligible intervention was assessed for impact using a 
randomised or rigorous quasi-experimental design and reintegration, rehabilitation, 
behavioural change, or cognitive change outcomes (including risk reduction or reduction of 
offending). Eligible studies were then coded based on the characteristics of the study and 
other features such as type of intervention, participants, comparison groups, outcomes, 




Our search of the GPD and CD identified 14,793 potential studies, which represents 
the number of records captured across both databases prior to any systematic processing that 
is conducted to identify impact evaluations that are ultimately indexed in these databases. 
Given the small search result for the CD database (n = 147), all were assessed for relevance 
for this review regardless of the research design. Of the GPD search results, a total of 307 
were randomised controlled trials or quasi-experiments and were assessed for eligibility. After 
removing duplicates across the databases, the full-text of 311 studies captured by the searches 
were assessed according to the inclusion criteria outlined above, and none of the studies met 
the eligibility criteria. That is, no quantitative impact evaluations of mandatory interventions 
for terrorist offenders/at risk individuals aiming to rehabilitate/ change offender behaviour or 
 
CD. The GPD systematic search covers 42 academic databases. The CD covers a combination of databases, 
websites and individual journals, covering 22 indexed locations.  
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cognitions were identified, despite a comprehensive search and screening process. This result 
highlights the fact that few CVE interventions have been evaluated. Hence, to supplement the 
review, we conducted an additional search for academic literature and policy documents that 
focused more generally on discussing the issue of CVE program effectiveness and client 
participation.7  
A small body of literature exists that specifically considers the issue of mandatory 
participation in CVE interventions (e.g., Bell, 2015; Global Counter-terrorism Forum, n.d; 
Morton & Silber, 2018; Veldhuis, 2012). It needs to be emphasised that this identified corpus 
of literature and documents did not present evaluative evidence on the effectiveness of 
mandatory participation, but were descriptive policy review papers, theoretical accounts, or 
opinion pieces. The consistent theme in this literature is that participation must be voluntary 
for a CVE intervention to be effective. This view is based on the premise that mandatory 
participation is unlikely to achieve either the desired forms of cognitive or behavioural change 
and may actually serve to further entrench the radical views of those mandated to participate 
(Veldhuis, 2012). Morton and Silber (2018, pg., 19) state that “forcing individuals to 
participate in a program that requires cognitive openness to new ideas is unlikely to yield 
successful results and further antagonize these extremist offenders”.  
The assumption that involuntary participation will only reinforce negative attitudes 
and behaviours does have merit when considering experience with de-radicalisation programs 
in countries such as Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia and Indonesia. Interventions targeting 
terrorist offenders in countries such as Morocco, Yemen, Sudan, Singapore, Indonesia, and 
Malaysia tend to have some form of coercive element (i.e., clients are given little choice to 
participate) when it comes to facilitating client involvement.8 Programs in these nations can 
rely on persuasive techniques (dialogue, counselling, religious re-education) that aim to 
 
7 This included searching Google Scholar; Web of Science; PsycInfo and Social Science indexed databases, as 
relevant to the CVE field. Search terms included those used in the CVE rapid evidence review. See Cherney et 
al., 2020. We did not record the number of included vs excluded studies from these additional sources.   
8 Information provided by members of the consultative group: Daniel Koehler (German Institute on 
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actively invoke feelings of anger and guilt in order to influence participants to accept their 
mistakes, develop remorse, and become open to non-violent worldviews (Braddock, 2014; El-
Said, 2015). While this intends to change thoughts and attitudes by eliciting negative 
experiences and cognitive change around offending behaviour it can backfire. That is, it can 
create an effect known as reactance, which refers to the process of creating resistance to 
persuasion (Braddock, 2019). Its relevance to the issue of CVE has gained attention, given 
many forms of counter-radicalisation strategies have some type of persuasive element aiming 
to influence behaviour and attitudes (Braddock, 2019, 2020). Resistance to persuasion can 
occur in the mind of offenders when exposed to arguments against their behaviour, creating 
immunity against attempts to change their behaviours or attitudes. This constitutes a 
significant risk to the reintegration and disengagement goals of CVE programming that has 
mandatory or coercive elements, as individuals may feel and are resentful, that they have no 
choice but to participate (creating a perceived sense of unfairness in their minds) and hence 
only become more entrenched in the views they have (Braddock, 2014; Cherney & Belton, 
2018). The consequence is that this can further impact future attempts to induce de-
radicalisation making it more difficult or even unachievable (Braddock, 2014, 2019; Koehler, 
2017). However, empirical evidence on whether this is the case is not yet available.  
The specific topic of mandatory interventions delivered in prison/custodial settings has 
been given some attention within the literature. It has been argued that the nature of custodial 
environments and the conditions to which inmates are subject, may actually facilitate 
antagonism and resistance against cooperating with de-radicalisation efforts and inmates 
willingness to participate in an intervention (Cherney, 2018a; Mullins, 2010). On the other 
hand, within a prison context, some level of coercive or mandatory element to facilitate client 
participation in particular elements of a program may be necessary in order to prevent 
deviation from program activities, or free riding amongst participants (Koehler, 2017). That 
is, these outcomes are minimised given clients are compelled to comply with mandatory 
conditions and hence the integrity of the program is maintained. Additionally, it can be the 
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individuals or associates, thus decreasing their influence, which may, therefor increase 
susceptibility to “cognitive openings” that can challenge extremist views and promote offence 
insights (Wiktorowicz, 2005). In such a context, mandatory participation may therefore carry 
some benefits. However, some scholars argue that such cognitive openings are more likely to 
occur when voluntary strategies are utilised, because they have a better chance of promoting a 
willingness to hear alternative ideas and accept support (Bell, 2015).  
 
Violent and sex offender programs  
The violent and sex offender search in the GPD and CD identified 62,106 potential 
studies, which represents the number of records captured across both databases prior to any 
systematic processing that is conducted to identify impact evaluations that are ultimately 
indexed in these databases. After removing duplicates across the two searches, a total of 549 
randomised controlled trials or quasi-experiments and were assessed for eligibility. A total of 
14 studies met the eligibility criteria for document synthesis and analysis. These studies 
covered programs concerned with addressing intimate partner violence and high-risk violent 
offenders released into the community. Limitations in space only allow us to provide a 
summary of these findings.9  
Ten studies directly related to violent offender programs (Akoensi et al., 2013; 
Babcock, Green & Robie, 2004; Feder and Wilson 2005; Ferrer-Perez and Bosch-Fiol 2018; 
Hogan, Lambert & Barton-Bellessa, 2012; Hyatt & Barnes, 2017; Loeffler et al., 2010; Mills, 
Barocas & Ariel 2013; Smedslund et al. 2007; Stewart et al., 2005; Taylor, Davis & Maxwell, 
2001). In reviewing the evidence of violent offender interventions, some themes emerged 
from the evidence. First, across both the meta-analyses and individual program evaluations, 
the effectiveness of mandating treatment is mixed and inconclusive. In some instances, 
mandatory programs exhibited positive effects on reducing rates of reoffending (Smedslund et 
al., 2007; Stewart et al., 2005; Taylor, Davis & Maxwell, 2001). However, the nuances of 
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such findings should be kept in mind. For example, in reference to studies that adopted quasi-
experimental designs, Feder and Wilson (2005) found that domestic violence abusers who 
were mandated to treatment and completed their program reoffended at a substantially lower 
rate than offenders who were mandated and did not complete their treatment. Also one 
common element among successful mandatory interventions was the presence of CBT or 
similar styles of rehabilitative programming (e.g., Smedslund et al., 2007 Loeffler et al., 2010 
as it pertains to domestic violent offending and Hogan, Lambert & Barton-Bellessa, 2012 as it 
relates to high risk inmates). In relation to the mandated supervision of high-risk offenders in 
the community, Hyatt and Barnes’ (2017) U.S study found that the strategy of mandating 
probationers to an increased level of supervision - in this case it included weekly face-to-face 
meetings with their probation officer and drug testing - had no statistically significant effects 
on reoffending. One problem noted by some studies was the high dropout rate amongst 
individuals in mandated programs (Ferrer-Perez & Bosch-Fiol, 2018). In specific reference to 
court-mandated treatment for domestic violence offenders, Ferrer-Perez & Bosch-Fiol, (2018) 
stated that a lack of motivation on behalf of perpetrators undergoing involuntary treatment is a 
cause of high dropout rates.  However, participant attrition is noted as a common problem for 
violent offender treatment programs regardless of whether they are mandatory or voluntary 
(Olver, Stockdale & Wormith, 2011). 
In relation to sex offender programs varied results were also found. A series of 
systematic reviews found that whether an offender entered treatment voluntarily or on a 
mandatory basis made no difference to any observed sexual recidivism (Losel & Schmucker, 
2005; Schmucker & Losel 2015, 2017). The authors suggested that other factors such as the 
provision of individualised treatment, CBT-based interventions, and therapeutic settings were 
more likely to have an impact on sexual reoffending than the role of mandated participation. 
Lambie and Stewart (2012) study examined the recidivism rate of individuals mandated by 
the courts in New Zealand to three community-based child sexual offender treatment 
programs. Their study included a probation only comparison group who did not receive 
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individual and family therapy) and group components (e.g., relationship skills and relapse 
prevention).  Their results showed no significant difference between the recidivism rates for 
any of the three programs. However, differences were found between the treatment versus no 
treatment groups, in that recidivism occurred less and at a delayed rate amongst the treatment 
group compared with the probation only comparison group.  
In summary our evidence review across violent and sex offending programming 
indicated mixed results as to the effectiveness of mandating participation in rehabilitation 
programs. Some studies found that voluntary programs had an impact on rates of reoffending, 
while other mandatory schemes did not. Hence, the violent and sex offender literature 
indicates that the impact of mandated participation on behavioural and cognitive change is, at 
best, inconclusive. That is, studies could not identify whether mandatory participation did or 
did not make a difference to program effectiveness, rehabilitative outcomes, or reoffending. 
The benefits of exposure to rehabilitative programming under mandatory conditions, 
however, was not dismissed. Possible features of effective programming included the 
presence of CBT and therapeutic interventions. 
 
Country specific approaches and experiences 
 
In this section we review country level experience and policy to understand how different 
jurisdictions have dealt with the conditions surround participating in CVE programs targeting 
convicted terrorist and at risk individuals. We limited ourselves to countries we were able to 
obtain specific information on relating to the mandatory nature of participation. This section 
draws on our findings from our policy and legislative review and information provided by 
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Europe 
Our review of the existing literature indicates variations across European countries as 
to the use of mandatory conditions relating to CVE programming. The specific case of the 
United Kingdom (UK) is discussed below.  
In France a pilot program in 2016 was developed and implemented in secret called the 
French Research and Intervention in Violent Extremism (RIVE) (Recherche et Intervention 
sur les Violences Extremists). It is reported that the pilot involved 14 men and women for 
whom attendance was mandatory (Lahnait, 2018). Mandatory attendance was required 
through judicial control or request by a judge (France 24, 2017; France Inter, 2017). The 
program targeted people already sentenced or awaiting sentencing for a terrorism-related 
offence or who were reported for being radicalised (France 24, 2017). The program aims were 
disengagement and reintegration and to provide support specific to the individual needs of 
participants. In some cases a client might meet with an expert on Islam (France 24, 2017) and 
a Muslim chaplain would provide religious guidance if required (Lahnait, 2018). There is no 
published research on the effectiveness of the RIVE. The intervention was discontinued 
because the contract with the intervention provider was not renewed (Letto, 2019).  
The RIVE initiative in France was replaced by another scheme termed PAIRS 
(Programme d’Accompagnement Individualisé et de Réaffiliation Sociale) in 2018 and is still 
in operation (Hecker 2021). The scheme involves a mix of mandated and voluntary clients 
and is covered by a legal and institutional framework that allows a judge to order 
participation, with non-compliance risking a person being placed in custody. Hecker (2021) 
undertook an evaluation of the PAIRS initiative. Hecker’s (2021) presents findings that some 
individuals who are under a legal obligation to participate, can express a hostile and 
indifferent attitude when attending meetings. Hecker (2021, pg., 40) states that, “In general, 
voluntary participants willingly follow the program and see it as helpful”.  
In the Norwegian prison system a mentoring scheme is provided to radicalised inmates 
on a voluntary basis (ICSR, 2020). It is reported that only 9 of the 34 possible target group 















ISSN: 2363-9849          
though will have mandatory requirements to participate in regular prison activities and 
programs (e.g., work or cognitive behavioural change programs).  
The Dutch Team TER (Terrorists, Extremists and Radicals) initiative is run by the 
Netherlands government. The nationally operating Team TER helps the Dutch Probation 
Service to prevent radicalisation amongst Dutch probationers. It aims to disengage radicalised 
individuals (Muslims, right-and left-wing extremists) through the use of tailored approaches 
to influence individual behaviour (Radicalisation Awareness Network, [RAN], 2019). The 
Team includes 18 trained probation officers and has a legal mandate to work with clients who 
can be directed to engage the Team TER as a condition of their impending release and 
supervision in the community (van der, Heide & Schuurman, 2018; Radicalisation Awareness 
Network, 2019). A Dutch study by Weggemans and de Graaf (2017), into the reintegration of 
jihadist detainees in the Netherlands included interviews with professionals involved in the 
delivery of reintegration initiatives. One issue raised by interviewees was that given the 
voluntary nature of these initiatives they felt powerless to compel former detainees to 
participate. The best practitioners could do was to use forms of assistance in housing, welfare, 
employment and psychological care as leverage to encourage participation. Some 
interviewees commented that it was difficult to implement voluntary programs and that if 
participants failed to attend appointments for example, there was little they could do 
(Weggemans & de Graaf, 2017, pg. 109-110).  
In Sweden, the Swedish Prison and Probation Service does not use parole boards and 
all inmates are automatically released after serving two-thirds of their sentence. Over the next 
nine years it is reported that Sweden is set to release 32 extremist inmates (ICSR, 2020). Once 
released these inmates will be subject to the mandatory condition of attending regular 
meetings with their probation officer. All clients must participate in these sessions regardless 
of their attitude or motivation for change and can be directed to participate in other treatment 
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Reports from Germany indicate that participation in programs to rehabilitate convicted 
terrorists or radicalised individuals is generally not mandatory.10 In Belgium, individual 
participation in a de-radicalisation/disengagement program may be mandated as part of an 
individual’s probation or in cases of a suspended sentence when certain conditions are 
imposed.11 CVE efforts in Belgium can often be divided by Francophone (French speaking 
regions) and Flemish (Dutch speaking regions) differences and distinctions. On the 
Francophone side, some individual cases are under judicial mandate, typically probation, 
which can include certain mandated conditions such as attending a CVE intervention. In some 
instances, individual cases under judicial mandate have been taken over by other agencies 
(e.g., local prevention officials, or NGOs).12 
 
Asia and the Middle East 
As already noted above CVE schemes in Asia and the Middle East targeting convicted 
terrorists or radicalised offenders while voluntary, can often involve forms of coercion to 
participate. One common approach is the use of de-radicalisation centres (referred to as 
rehabilitation centres in Sri Lanka and Saudia Arabia; see Boucek, 2008, Hettiarachchi, 2018; 
Perliger 2020), where program beneficiaries are all housed in the one location and receive 
therapeutic support and other forms of assistance such as job training. While offering the 
opportunity to deliver targeted interventions to large numbers of individuals, participants have 
little choice but to consent to participate (hence are underpinned by implicit coercion). In 
Indonesia there is legislative provision relating to the delivery of de-radicalisation 
programming to terrorist convicts or those exposed to terrorist views (Institute for Criminal 
 
10 Information provided by consultative group – Daniel Koehler (German Institute on Radicalization and De-
radicalization Studies); and Sofia Koller (Research Fellow, Project Leader InFoEx, German Council on Foreign 
Relations DGAP).  
11 Information provided by consultancy group – Thomas Renard (Egmont Institute. Royal Institute for 
International Relations. Belgium).  
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Justice Reform, 2018). Recent amendments to these laws make reference to these 
interventions being mandatory for prisoners and individuals seeking parole.13  
 
Canada  
Based on information provided from academic contacts in Canada,14 mandatory 
participation in Canadian CVE programs has not been adopted in any universal fashion. It has 
only been used in a limited number of cases in relation to conditions imposed by the Canadian 
parole board relating to the release of convicted terrorists (Bell, 2020). In 2016, for example, 
an individual named Aaron Driver, a covert to jihadism and who was shot dead by police in 
the act of perpetrating a terrorist offence, was placed on what is termed a “peace bond” due to 
his extremist behavior (Amarasingam, 2016; McKeon, 2017). A peace bond is used by the 
Royal Canadian Mounted Police against people who they think are likely to commit an 
offence, but where police lack evidence to charge the individual (Canadian Department of 
Justice, 2015). It can impose a range of conditions on the offender. In the case of Driver this 
included that he had to participate in some religious counselling to correct his understanding 
of Islam.15 This was seen in Canada, however, as an infringement of his constitutional rights 
and was subsequently challenged and dropped (CBC online, 2016). A recent case is that of 
Mohamed Hassan Hersi, who was charged with trying to leave Canada to join a terrorist 
group (Bell, 2020). A number of special conditions will be imposed upon Hersi when he is 
released, which include the condition that he undergo treatment for his extremist beliefs and 
behaviours (Bell, 2020). Another example is that of Pamir Hakimzadah, who was convicted 
of attempting to join ISIS and was released on parole in 2019, with him subject to a range of 
conditions including a requirement that he attend counselling and meet weekly with an Imam 
(Bell, 2019).  
 
13 Information provided by consultancy group - Idhamsyah Eka Putra (Persada Indonesia University); and Fajar 
Erikha (Lecturer, Deputy Director, Universitas Nahdlatul Ulama Indonesia).  
14 Information was provided by Professor Lorne Dawson (University of Waterloo); Dr Amarnath Amarasingam 
(Queens University), and Professor Sarah Thompson (Ryerson University).  
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The UK Desistance and Disengagement Programme  
The UK Desistance and Disengagement Programme (DDP) targets convicted terrorists 
and terrorist related offenders. This includes what are referred to as ‘TACT’ offenders (in 
reference to individuals convicted under the U.K. Terrorism Act) and non-TACT individuals. 
It provides support for individuals in prison and in the community. It is a case-managed 
intervention, funded and sponsored by the UK Home Office. It provides a range of 
interventions spanning mentoring, theological and psychological support, plus a discretionary 
practical fund to support participants. It aims to address the drivers of radicalisation around 
needs for identity, self-esteem, meaning and purpose, and personal grievances. Its objectives 
include de-radicalisation, rapport building, changing mindsets and strengthening protective 
factors, social integration, employment and training, improving family and personal 
relationships and broader support (DDP Operating Guide, 2020). The DDP case management 
process involves case identification and referral, client case assessment and acceptance, 
intervention provider selection and commissioning, intervention delivery, case review and 
evaluation and case exit and closure. Intervention providers (including government and non-
government agencies) are the main mechanism of delivering the DDP (DDP Operating Guide, 
2020).  
The DDP is offered to those in prison that have been convicted of a TACT or terrorist 
related offence and ‘at-risk’ non-TACT individuals. Those approaching their release date are 
prioritised with a view of their transition onto probation. The DDP is also offered to 
TACT/related offenders on probation in the community and can be a condition of their 
license. The same conditions can apply to individuals who have been subject to what are 
called Terrorism Prevention Investigation Measures (TPIMs) and Temporary Exclusion 
Orders (TEOs). The DDP can be mandated for individuals subject to TPIMs and TEOs. 
TPIMs target individuals who present a terrorist risk but have not been prosecuted and whom 
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assessed as not feasible either to prosecute or deport the individual (Anderson, 2014).16 TEOs 
are legislated under the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 201517 and target individuals 
who are suspected of being involved in terrorist-related activity outside the U.K (e.g., 
returning foreign fighters). Individuals subject to a TEO who return to the UK have to agree 
to a range of conditions relating to their movements, reporting and attendance at 
appointments. Where the DDP is mandated for individuals on probation or subject to court-
approved conditions, non-compliance can lead to the individual being charged for breach of 
their conditions, which may result in them being recalled to prison (if on probation) or given a 
prison sentence (if in breach of a TPIM or TEO) (DDP Operating Guide, 2020).  
The DDP is located within the Prevent strand of the UK’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy 
CONTEST. Not a lot is known publicly about the program and there are few open-source 
documents on its content and implementation, with it currently not having been subject to any 
evaluation (Elshimi, 2020). Figures reported in the media are that in 2019 about 110 
convicted and suspected terrorists were participating in the DDP (Drury & Barrett, 2019).  
Recent cases of radicalised individuals who have been required to participate in the 
DDP have called into question its effectiveness and capacity to reduce ongoing risk. For 
example, one case includes that of Usman Khan (London Bridge attacker). Khan was 
sentenced in 2012 along with other co-offenders for plotting a terrorist attack. When released 
on licence he was subject to a range of conditions standard for terrorist offenders in the UK 
(e.g., electronic monitoring, community supervision and banned from certain associations), 
which included participating in the DDP. Khan received assistance under the DDP which 
included mentoring. Khan travelled to London in November 2019 to participate in a 
Cambridge University prison rehabilitation event. During the event Khan left and put on a 
 
16In 2020 there were proposals to create “enduring TPIMs”. Enduring TPIMs are to focus on long-standing 
subjects of interest who are engaged in radicalisation rather than attacks. It proposes to remove the two-year 
limit on the use of TPIMs (Grierson, 2020b).  
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fake suicide vest and also attacked and killed two delegates and injured three in a knife attack. 
He was shot dead by police (Casciani, 2019; Warrell, 2019).  
There is varying information about whether Khan had been “gaming” the system and 
appearing cooperative when participating in the DDP (Casciani, 2019; Warrell, 2019). One 
former Scotland Yard officer who mentored Khan during his participation in the DDP stated 
he had a “suspiciously rehearsed persona” and reported he witnessed Khan losing his temper 
during a meeting with him, and was angry about his licence conditions (Kerbaj, 2019). Other 
details about how Khan was dealt with include reporting that Prevent officers responsible for 
monitoring Khan had no training in dealing with a terrorist offender. Police who visited Khan 
two weeks before the attack reported that Khan was jobless, living alone and antagonistic 
during the visit. His mentoring had also ceased. It was reported at a pre-inquest inquiry into 
the attack that there were questions about the effective monitoring and supervision of Khan 
(Grierson, 2020a). A full inquest into the attack begin in May 2021.  
The Khan case raised questions about the effectiveness of CVE interventions such as 
the DDP, and whether mandated participation makes a difference when offenders may just 
decide to deceive intervention staff – referred to as disguised compliance (Acheson, 2020). It 
should be noted though that this problem has not been confined to the UK. There was the 
recent case in Germany of the Dresden knife attacker, Abdullah al H. H., who had been 
provided counselling by one of Germanys largest non-government de-radicalisation providers 
and who it appeared deceived staff about his extremist beliefs and actions (Reinhard, 2020). 
Another example includes the Vienna case of an Islamic State supporter, who in 2020 shot 4 
people and injured 23 individuals in central Vienna. This individual had tried to enter Syria, 
was deported back to Austria and receive a reduced sentence, which included the condition of 
participating in a de-radicalisation program. It would appear this individual was able to 
deceive his mentors that he presented no immediate risk and had renounced his radical beliefs 
(Oltermann, Connolly & Burke, 2020). In reference to the Khan case, Renard (2020) argues 
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given the number of radicalised offenders who have been released into the community in the 
UK.  
 
Summary of international experience 
In summary our review of country-specific experience and policy indicates that 
mandated participation in an intervention or support scheme is most commonly utilised as part 
of community supervision conditions (probation/parole) when radicalised offenders are 
released from prison. Internationally, most CVE programs are voluntary. However, some 
schemes do involve implicit forms of coercion to promote participation. The United 
Kingdom’s Desistance and Disengagement Programme (DDP) and the French PAIRS 
intervention were the only specifically named schemes that we identified as linked to 
mandated legal conditions. Anecdotal experience from the U.K. indicates that mandated 
participation does not guarantee success. The problem of disguised compliance is a risk, and 
some offenders may attempt to deceive staff. Having adequate quality assurance processes to 
monitor client participation, well trained staff, multiple data sources to assess client progress 
and comprehensive risk assessments that are completed regularly, are all essential to 
addressing this problem. 
 
Implementation issues and drawbacks and benefits  
 
In this section we expand on the findings above to further explore the drawbacks of 
mandating participation in CVE interventions, along with consideration of the possible 
benefits of mandated treatment, and other types of issues that need to be considered.   
A consistent argument made by CVE scholars is that disengagement programs should 
be based on respectful and non-coercive approaches, ideally to avoid participant resentment 
and resistance (Cherney, 2018c; Koehler, 2017). Hence, as we indicate above, it is generally 
argued that programs should be implemented in a voluntary fashion. Regardless of mandatory 
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(violent and sexual) suggest that programs targeting them suffer from high rates of participant 
dropout and attrition (Ferrer-Perez & Bosch-Fiol, 2018; Hanson, Broom & Stephenson, 
2004). Mandated intervention may help to minimise this, but the problem then arises as to 
what do with those who do not comply with mandated conditions. An appropriate response 
and punishment for non-compliance needs to help generate genuine motivation to participate. 
While sending individuals back to prison might be one response to violations of mandated 
conditions, this does not help prepare them for eventual release into the community.  
One drawback of mandated interventions pointed out in the literature, is that it does 
not inspire the needed motivation necessary for treatment to be effective (Lambert, et al., 
2007). Drawing on a study of offenders in maximum-security, Lambert et al. (2007) notes that 
candidates who voluntarily participate in a program are often more susceptible to treatment 
compared with those who are forced. Additionally, investigations of coercive treatment in 
correctional settings suggest that even when involuntary participants do not necessarily resist 
treatment, the presence of someone who absolutely does not want to participate can have a 
negative impact on the treatment environment (Miller et al., 2010). Also, inmates who are 
forced to participate in treatment can consume a disproportionate amount of time and 
resources relative to offenders who voluntarily consent given the need to deal with episodes 
of noncompliance, poor attendance and motivation (Miller et al., 2010). In effect, the 
implication arising from arguments presented in the literature is that mandating treatment can 
carry risks to the success of programs that aim to rehabilitate radicalised offenders. 
Research has also drawn attention to how mandated interventions can have an impact 
on client and intervention-provider interactions and relationships (Hachtel, Vogel & Huber, 
2019). For example, research on the topic of criminal justice mandated treatment for mentally 
ill individuals has indicted how it can change the therapeutic relationship between clients and 
treatment providers (Manchak, Skeem & Rook, 2014; Skeem et al., 2007). The concern is that 
in such a context, the relationship can move beyond the provision of care to that of control 
and compliance. The risk is that too much of a focus on the latter can lead to anger and 
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create a sense of helplessness that detrimentally impacts on therapeutic engagement 
(Manchak, Skeem & Rook, 2014; Monahan. et al., 1995). This can undermine the quality of 
care provided and make clients resentful and resistance to change.  
A key theme within correctional research is how the quality of the relationship 
between parole/probation supervisors and the individuals they supervise impacts reoffending 
(Kennealy, et al., 2012; Skeem, et al., 2007). It is argued that mandated treatment or 
involuntary programming can potentially undermine the quality of such relationships (Skeem 
et al., 2007) and finding a balance between providing care and focusing on compliance can be 
challenging for supervisors or practitioners (Manchak, Skeem & Rook, 2014).  
These issues need to be considered in the context of agencies working with convicted 
terrorists or individuals who have radicalised to violent extremism. For example, it is argued 
that anti-authoritarian and anti-government sentiment in part drives radicalisation in 
combination with grievances about perceived injustices (van den Bos, 2018; Hafez & Mullins, 
2015). Hence radicalised offenders in prison or under community supervision, may perceive 
mandated interventions as an example of authorities treating them unfairly by forcing them 
into a program, thus increasing the grievances about how they are treated. This can potentially 
make it harder to engage radicalised inmates in programs aimed at de-radicalisation and 
community reintegration.  
While finding evidence against the benefits of involuntary treatment, Manchak, Skeem 
and Rook (2014), found that even in the context of criminal justice mandated treatment (court 
ordered) for mentally ill individuals, this does not always negatively influence client and 
therapist relationships or intervention outcomes and that this will vary on a case-by-case 
basis. At best, there may be a neutral effect of mandatory programming (Farabee, Prendergast 
& Anglin, 1998; Prendergast, et al., 2002). Also the literature continues to demonstrate that 
high-risk offenders do benefit the most from some form of rehabilitative programming 
(Andrews, Bonta & Hoge, 1990; Lipsey, 1999). However, this group is the least likely to 
volunteer for treatment (Andrews, Bonta & Hoge, 1990; Lipsey, 1999). This presents a 
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invested participants, if offenders are largely hesitant to volunteer, participation rates may be 
so low in a program that it produces little benefit.  
Hence, while the literature does find fault with mandated treatment, even in such 
contexts authors concede to the importance of exposing individuals to interventions. For 
example, a study by Miller et al. (2010), indicated that offenders can become motivated to 
change through coerced treatment via the simple introduction of rehabilitative services. 
Additionally, mandated treatment does not necessarily have to result in the perception of a 
coercive environment or a sense of anger and resentment towards participation. A key 
argument is that if approaches use supportive, responsive and personalised tailored treatment 
styles, this often creates favourable working alliances, therapeutic outcomes and a sense of 
motivation to change (Hachtel, Vogel & Huber, 2019). This does demonstrate that 
encouraging offender participation and change, while difficult to elicit via mandated efforts, 
can still be facilitated under involuntary conditions.  
This points to the need for intervention providers to have a clear understanding of how 
specific motivations influence the quality of participation and willingness to engage in an 
intervention. It needs to be acknowledged that a lack of motivation and an unwillingness to 
change is not a permanent state of mind among extremist offenders subject to interventions 
(Cherney, 2018c; Walkenhorst, et al., 2020). A recent Radicalisation Awareness Network 
(RAN) rehabilitation manual on working with terrorist offenders, recommended that 
addressing factors like self-confidence and trust in others over time can create key cognitive 
openings for change amongst program participants (see Walkenhorst, et al., 2020). Targeting 
motivations is concerned with strengthening and supporting positive behaviours and helping 
individuals to avoid extremist associates and environments. Other third parties such as 
partners, family members and mentors have an important role to play in facilitating and 
supporting motivations to change (Butt & Tuck, 2014; Cherney, 2018c; Koehler, 2017; 
Koehler, & Ehrt, 2018). While these observations are relevant to either voluntary or 
mandatory programs, the implication is that it is the content of an intervention that matters a 



















A rapid review of the evaluation literature across the fields of CVE, violent and sex offender 
schemes finds arguments and evidence for and against mandated participation. The evidence 
from studies on sex and violent offender schemes indicate there is mixed evidence for  
mandated interventions. While evidence does not clearly support the effectiveness of 
mandated participation, the exposure of offenders to treatment under mandated schemes may 
offer some benefits. Hence the situation is far more complex than simply rejecting it as a 
viable approach.  
The literature indicates that the implementation of policy, or legislative schemes, that 
mandate CVE program participation in the prison or community context must consider a 
range of issues that will impact on the viability and effectiveness of such an approach. 
Consideration needs to be given to how target groups will respond to being forced to 
participate in an intervention, given it may only create resentment and a sense of unfairness 
which will make client engagement harder. There must be a focus on ensuring quality 
therapeutic relationships can be developed between clients and intervention providers so that 
tailored intervention plans can be collaboratively developed and progress towards intervention 
goals is achieved. Authorities and intervention providers need to avoid an emphasis upon 
simply enforcing compliance, control and surveillance, given this is not conducive to 
facilitating genuine engagement and motivations to change. Developing responses to incidents 
of non-compliance cannot simply punish participants, but need to look at factors and 
motivations contributing to such incidents. Interventions must be tailored so that they address 
specific motivations for change and focus on protective factors against radicalisation. Finally, 
it needs to be accepted that progress on a mandated intervention will vary amongst 
participants with their success and failures.  
Across different international jurisdictions participant involvement in CVE programs 
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well as to schemes imposing mandatory conditions. To date there is no strong evaluative 
evidence that one approach is more effective than the other, or that mandated schemes offer 
any specific advantages above voluntary schemes. There are challenges and drawbacks with 
any approach. Based on the evidence and literature reviewed here, it remains unclear whether 
mandating participation in CVE interventions offers greater overall benefits compared to 
voluntary programming and participation. This conclusion is cautionary considering the 
limited evidence that directly and rigorously evaluates programs in the CVE context. 
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